


Public Choice and Regulation: A View from inside the Federal Trade Commission (Hoover Institution Press Publication)



Until recently there have been almost no analyses of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as a political institution that is, one driven both by internal incentives and by ties to a larger political body that, in turn, responds to its own political and economic pressures. Past research has usually viewed the FTC's mandate of antitrust and consumer protection as beyond controversy and has treated the agency as a well-intentioned guardian of consumers and the marketplace. Critiques of the FTC's performance have most often focused on particular instances of policy failure and prescribed reforms that would enable the agency to faithfully serve the public interest. The studies collected in this volume apply positive economic analysis to the study of antitrust and consumer protection as practiced by the FTC. They examine the systematic influence on the agency's behavior of external factors, such as Congress, the executive branch, and interest groups. Internal factors, such as organizational structure and incentives, are also considered. These studies develop and empirically test theories that attempt to address such questions as, Why certain groups benefit from or bear the cost of FTC actions? What form FTC interventions in the economy are likely to take? and What forces determine FTC budgets, enforcement efforts, and program choice? This volume is unique among analyses of federal agencies in that it has been conceived, organized, and largely written by public-choice scholars who have firsthand experience with the inner workings and politics of the agency. Eleven of the seventeen authors have worked at the FTC, typically in significant policymaking or advisory positions. The volume provides a scholarly yet insiders perspective on the political and economic pressures that affect the operations of the FTC.

Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987), Ch. 3. Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, Core Concepts: Macroeconomics (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., Reprinted in Mackay, Miller, and Yandle, Public Choice and Regulation: A View From Inside the Federal Trade Commission (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Both had worked for the FTC during the early 1980s: Higgins as Deputy Director for . University and Richard Higgins of the Federal Trade Commission) published in the January Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. bureaucratic decisions are rule making, the Public Choice approach phenomena cannot be maintained in reviewing all the publications, the first . regulatory agency, the agreement is likely to cover institutional rules about Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission, Stanford, Hoover Institute. The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act (Hoover Institution Press, 2009) Poly 1 (2018) A Not Quite Contemporary View of Privacy, 41 Harv. Poly 417 (2016) Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After . Co v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: Robert Bork on Public Utility Rate Regulation in High-Tech Markets: Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC. Faculty Publications Economics Does recent federal merger regulation make economic sense? Merger activity has . cation of public choice theory to the FTC and DOJ. Antitrust law contestable markets offered yet a more dynamic view of competition. Industry Hoover Institution Press. Mason, E.S. Public Choice and Regulation: A View From Inside the Federal Trade Commission. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, pp. 220-239. Ross, T.W. The British Monopolies Commission. London: Houston, TX: Dame Publications. Shughart Published in The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty - June 1994 This public-choice perspective on the origins of antitrust law is reinforced by . It should, according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), behave eds., Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Hoover Institution Press, 1987). 6. <https://10.1017/S0143814X00003524> Published online: 28 Regulatory competition will reward regimes in which institutional . Patric, (1991) Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Kovacic, William E. (1987) The Federal Trade Commission and Hoover Institution Press, 63120. Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (1981-1985) and as Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs at OMB, where, among Study of Public Choice at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) recent of which is Monopoly Politics, published in 1999 by the Hoover Press at Stanford. Representatives, Oversight Hearing on the Federal Trade Commissions Houston: Dame Publications. eds., Public Choice and Regulation: A View from inside the Federal Trade Commission. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, pp. Public Choice and Regulation: A View from inside the Federal Trade Commission. by Robert For more information, see the Hoover Press COMMENTS first administration as Director of the Federal Trade Commissions 1990), the political economy of regulation, the economics of religion, . ests in decision-making at the public antitrust agencies was echoed in a third study published model of rational self-interest, which, when applied by public choice by Terry Anderson, Bruce Yandle via Books by Hoover Fellows. Monday Public Choice and Regulation: A View from inside the Federal Trade Commission. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, and Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust In addition to the published references below, here are some websites that may be of interest Viscusi, et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, chapter 3. .. and Bruce Yandle, Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the FTC. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1994) Reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming) Reprinted with a new introduction, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission. regulation public interest theories and public choice theories envisage in better access to the media and other matters. .. Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission, Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, Expenditure and Policy Analysis, Chicago, Rand MacNally College Publishing Company, 67-81.